Αρνήθηκε να δεχθεί έναρξη των διαδικασιών ένταξης της Τουρκίας στην ΕΕ ο πρωθυπουργός Α.Τσίπρας αν δεν εφαρμοστεί το πρωτόκολλο της Άγκυρας και δεν αρθεί το casus belli για τα 12 μίλια από την Αγκυρα, αλλά και να αποχωρήσουν τα τουρκικά στρατεύματα κατοχής από την Κύπρο. 

Προϋπόθεση για το άνοιγμα των κεφαλαίων της ενταξιακής διαδικασίας τόνισε ο Ελληνας πρωθυπουργός κατά την παρέμβασή του στη Σύνοδο των 28 ηγετών της Ε.Ε., είναι να υπάρξει σεβασμός των συνθηκών από την Τουρκία.

Ο Πρωθυπουργός στήριξε απόλυτα και τις θέσεις της Κύπρου, που όπως είχε τονίσει νωρίτερα ο κυβερνητικός εκπρόσωπος, Νίκος Χριστοδουλίδης “…τα κεφάλαια των διαπραγματεύσεων για την ένταξη της Τουρκίας στην ΕΕ, τα οποία έχουν παραμείνει κλειστά με πρωτοβουλία της Κύπρου, θα ανοίξουν μόνο όταν η Τουρκία εκπληρώσει τις υποχρεώσεις της”.

Το πρόσθετο πρωτόκολλο της Άγκυρας, μια συμφωνία του προνοεί το άνοιγμα των τουρκικών λιμανιών και αεροδρομίων στα κυπριακά πλοία και αεροπλάνα.

Το περίφημο “Πρωτόκολλο της Άγκυρας” στο οποίο τόσο σημαντικά ζητήματα βασίζει η ελληνική αλλά κυρίως η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατίας σχετικά με τις υποχρεώσεις της Άγκυρας έναντι της ΕΕ, πάντως κατά τα WikiLeaks, δεν υπάρχει! 

Από την ανάγνωση εμπιστευτικού εγγράφου του Σταίητ Ντηπάρτμεντ που διέρρευσε στα WikiLeaks και αναφέρεται σε συζήτηση Αμερικανού διπλωμάτη με τον Ολλανδό διπλωμάτη που μετείχε της Συνόδου Κορυφής στην οποία αποφασίστηκε η απόδοση στην Τουρκία ημερομηνίας εκκίνησης διαπραγματεύσεων, για τη συμμετοχή της στην ΕΕ!

Από το πλήρες κείμενο του τηλεγραφήματος αβίαστα προκύπτει πως έγινε όλη η τελική διαπραγμάτευση και η ΕΕ υποχρεώθηκε να δεχθεί ένα Τούρκικο εκβιασμό, που από τότε συνεχίζεται αδιαμαρτύρητα!

Σύμφωνα με τον Ολλανδό διπλωμάτη Πήτερ Ντεγκόγιερ (Pieter de Gooijer, διευθυντής Ευρωπαϊκών υποθέσεων, τότε), ο Τούρκος πρωθυπουργός Ταγίπ Ερντογάν στη Σύνοδο Κορυφής του Δεκεμβρίου, αποχώρησε όταν συνειδητοποίησε ότι θα έπρεπε να αποδεχθεί την αναγνώριση της Κύπρου προκειμένου να του δοθεί ημερομηνία και οι Ολλανδοί, ζήτησαν από τον τότε Βρεταννό πρωθυπουργό Τόνι Μπλερ να παρέμβει για να επιλυθεί η κρίση.

Ο κ. Μπλερ λοιπόν, κυνήγησε τον Τ. Ερντογάν ως το ξενοδοχείο του όπου τον έπεισε “να μην χάσει την ευκαιρία” και να επιστρέψει μαζί του στο Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο, την ώρα που ο  Γάλλος πρόεδρος  Ζισκάρ ντ Εσταίνγκ, ο Γερμανός Καγελλάριος Γκέρχαρντ Σρέντερ και ο προεδρεύων Ολλανδός πρωθυπουργός, Γιάν Π. Μπαλκενέντε, πίεζαν και τελικά έπεισαν τον Κύπριο πρόεδρο Τάσσο Παπαδόπουλο, να αποδεχθεί τις ρυθμίσεις με τις οποίες εξασφαλιζόταν η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία. Δηλαδή το “Πρωτόκολλο” με το οποίο (αν και δεν ήταν μέρος του τελικού ανακοινωθέντος) η Τουρκία αποδεχόταν τη διαδικασία έμμεσης αναγνώρισης της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας.

Ωστόσο, όπως αναφέρει ο συνομιλητής (και βαθύς γνώστης των γεγονότων) του Αμερικανού διπλωμάτη Άντριου Σόφερ (Andrew Schofer), “οι ιστορικοί του μέλλοντος, όσο και να ψάξουν δεν πρόκειται να βρουν ποτέ παρόμοιο πρωτόκολλο γιατί απλά ουδέποτε υπεγράφη κάτι σχετικό”! Όλοι αναφέρονται σ αυτό, λέει ο κ. Ντεγκόγιερ, αλλά κανείς δεν μπορεί να το επιδείξει.

Επειδή τα λεγόμενα του Ολλανδού διπλωμάτη αλλάζουν άρδην πολλές παραμέτρους της Ελληνικής και της Κυπριακής εξωτερικής πολιτικής σε σχέση με το Κυπριακό και τη στάση της Άγκυρας, καλό θα ήταν να υπάρξει έρευνα και αντίδραση στο σχετικό τηλεγράφημα του Σταίητ Ντηπάρτμεντ ενώ θα άξιζε να ερωτηθεί για το σκοπό αυτό και η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση.

Ολόκληρο το ενδιαφέρον κείμενο του τηλεγραφήματος στα αγγλικά παρακάτω.

Embassy The Hague

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 THE HAGUE 003333 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2014

TAGS: PREL NL TU CY EUN INRB

SUBJECT: TURKEY ACCESSION/EU: THE MYSTERIOUS CASE OF THE

MISSING DECLARATION 

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew Schofer for reasons 1.4 (b) a

nd (d). 

¶1. SUMMARY: (C) According to Dutch diplomat Pieter de

Gooijer, the intense Dutch-led negotiations leading to the EU

Council’s invitation to Turkey for accession talks were one

for the history books. In a recent conversation with DCM

and Poloff, he provided the inside story of the last hours

of the talks in Brussels, which he witnessed first hand. De

Gooijer claimed three events were especially critical in

bringing about a positive decision: President Chirac’s

seigniorial push to Cypriot President Papadopoulos; PM Blair

fetching Turkish PM Erdogan back from his hotel before he

could hold a fatal fatal press conference; and Dutch

finessing of the Council Conclusions text that welcomed and

quoted a Turkish declaration on the Ankara Agreement that

never really existed. END SUMMARY 

¶2. (C) Pieter de Gooijer (MFA European Integration director

and main working negotiator for the Presidency) related the

inside story of the final Turkey accession negotiations to

DCM and Poloff on the margins of a reception hosted by the

DCM on December 20. De Gooijer was at the center of Council

negotiations with PM Balkenende and FM Bot, starting

Thursday, December 16. Looking back, de Gooijer said, PM

Balkenende was still angry on the following Monday about how

the Turkish delegation treated him last week and how Erdogan

behaved after the fact back home. De Gooijer, a veteran of

Turkish postings (as is FM Bot), said Balkenende had missed

the back slapping and bear hugs that marked the elated

reactions of Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania. I had to remind

him, as I had done all during the negotiations themselves,

that the Turks came to this like a negotiation for a rug in

the bazaar. If things had run in a straight line, they would

have suspected they could have gotten a better deal. By the

same token, he added, bazaar psychology dictated that PM

Erdogan appear dissatisfied with the result after the fact as

¶3. (C) At the beginning on Thursday, December 16, De

Gooijer said that the Netherlands Presidency delegation met

the Turks around 4:30 pm, where the Dutch told them they had

to do something on Cyprus. There was an immediate and

negative Turkish reaction to signing anything, he recalled.

With this in mind and while the heads of state were

sequestered at dinner, de Gooijer said he proposed that

Turkey could initial the protocol to the Ankara Agreement.

Initialing is not as final as signing, he had postulated.

It was a way for Turkey to acknowledge that this was where

the Cyprus issue stood, that they could accept the text ad

ref. Following this plan, the Dutch had circulated an

Annex to the Council Conclusions paragraph 19 (which

referred to Turkey’s signing the protocol of Ankara

Agreement) that acknowledged the initialing by the

Commission and Turkey of the Protocol. (Council document SN

220/04). Difficult talks between the Balkenende, FM Bot,

Erdogan and FM Gul ensued, with the Turks eventually

rejecting initialing as too much like signing. They never

appreciated the subtle, negotiator’s distinction between the

two, de Gooijer said. 

¶4. (C) The Annex was withdrawn on Friday morning, December

¶17. The Dutch fell back to a proposal that Turkey could make

a declaration of intent to sign the Protocol prior to the

actual start of accession negotiations. The Secretariat

published this as a revision to Council Decision paragraph 19

(Council Document SN 208/04). They got Turkish approval of

the concept in principal and then turned to sell it to

Cyprus. De Gooijer recalled a small meeting among President

Chirac, Chancellor Schroeder, PM Blair, Commission President

Barroso, and PM Balkenende with President Papadopoulos; the

full Council was meeting in a nearby room. Both PM Blair and

Chancellor Schroeder had made clear their intent to leave

Brussels around 1:30 pm, due to pressing business elsewhere

in Europe. With time slipping away for a deal, Papadopoulos

balked at a mere declaration. Finally, de Gooijer recalled,

President Chirac said, Tassos, look. Tony, Gerhard and I

all think this is a good solution. We have not much time. I

know you will agree. Chirac reportedly then stood up and

reached out for Papadopoulos, saying, Now let us go into the

meeting. And with that, de Gooijer said, Chirac shepherded

a slightly stunned Papadopoulos back to the Council

meeting. That is how the EU works in the end, de Gooijer

said, with the big countries ganging up on a small hold

¶5. (C) The Dutch still needed Turkey’s formal acquiescence

on the Declaration. De Gooijer said the Turks were

quibbling over words down to individual letters in the

Conclusions text. Worse, they refused to make the formal

declaration as foreseen in the text of Paragraph 19, which

welcomed it and supposedly quoted from it. By this time,

Erdogan had apparently abandoned the negotiations and was

heading back to the Conrad Hotel for an already scheduled 2

p.m. news conference. Balkenende called PM Blair, de Gooijer

said, and asked him to help. Blair volunteered to get in his

car and go after Erdogan; some time later, both men returned

to the Council building for the final round. 

¶6. (C) At this point, de Gooijer said he proposed that

Erdogan, Balkenende, and Barroso sign the page from the newly

issued draft Conclusions on which the revised Paragraph 19

stood, as a way of acknowledging agreement to its contents

and intent. I just tore the page from my book and drew

three lines at the bottom of it, de Gooijer recalled.

Erdogan refused to sign, as did Gul. De Gooijer said that he

then pointed out that someone from the political level

would have to accept Paragraph 19 in such a way that the rest

of the Council, especially Cyprus, would be satisfied that

Turkey agreed to sign the Protocol before October 3.

Finally, Erdogan instructed his State Secretary to sign on

behalf of Turkey; State Secretary Arzo Nicolai signed for the

Dutch, and Commissioner Rehn signed for the Commission; this

paper was then copied and circulated to the Council, de

Gooijer said. With this, the men returned to the Council,

where representatives of the other three candidate states

joined the 25 EU Member States for a final session and the

traditional family photograph. 

¶7. (C) As an addendum, a Council staffer who was note-taking

for the final session told USEU PolOff that things still

remained tense even after the agreement was reached. In the

final formal Council session, the EU-25, at the request of

Greece, had amended para 20 of the Conclusions (referring to

resolution of border disputes) so that it referred to Member

States (plural) vice Member State. When the four

candidates joined the 25 for champagne toasts, after

Romanian, Bulgarian and Croatian remarks about the historic

decisions, Erdogan took the floor. He, too, noted the

historic nature of the day, but then offered two substantive

comments. First, he said Turkey understood para 20 to still

be referring to one Member State in particular. And second,

the GoT underlined that it did not view signing of the

Protocol to the Ankara Agreement as recognition of Cyprus.

(NOTE: USEU’s source said Council discussion had already made

clear the EU was not going to include such a point in the

formal Conclusions, but the Dutch had agreed with the Turks

that, if the topic came up, Balkenende in the closing press

conference would note that the EU did not view the Protocol

signing as being the same as recognition.). Cypriot

President Papadopoulos responded to Erdogan that the

Conclusions were already agreed among the EU-25 and could not

be rewritten post-facto. Balkenende, who USEU’s source

described as growing visibly twitchy, stepped in to say

that all could agree that today had seen a historic

decision, and brought the discussion to a welcome close. 

¶8. (C) As for Turkey’s Declaration? It will forever be

missing; historians will search in vain for a paper since

there never was one, de Gooijer said with a grin. It was

the intent that counted. Summing up, de Gooijer said, We

all know what Turkey has to do, preferably sooner rather than

later and certainly not as late as October 2 (the day before

negotiations are supposed to start). And if the Turks come

in and quibble over the Declaration and their intent as

reflected in Paragraph 19? The EU would not start

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